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5 OCT 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Security Council
Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT : India-Pakistan Crisis Study

1. Reference is made to the study, "Intelligence Support in Political-Military Crises: A Case Study of the India-Pakistan Crisis of 1971." This is the first completed study in a program of studies of how well the intelligence community supports top level decision-makers during periods of political-military crisis. These studies attempt to answer the questions:

-- What were top leaders concerned about?

-- What actions did the intelligence community undertake to respond to top level needs?

-- What are the major lessons to be learned or questions to be raised?

2. The India-Pakistan study has already been distributed to key elements of the intelligence production community for study. The Working Group itself will undertake a detailed analysis of lessons learned with a view to preparing recommendations for improved procedures, taking into account not only this study but also the results of additional case studies, such as those now underway on Egypt-Israeli ceasefire of August 1970, the Jordan-Fedayeen civil war of September 1970, and LAMSON 719 of February - April 1971.

3. The purpose in sending the India-Pakistan study to the NSCIC at this time is to initiate a discussion of a few major issues and problem areas highlighted by the study. Three problem areas are of particular

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importance with regard to the NSCIC's task of giving guidance to the intelligence community:

-- Communication of intelligence needs from policy levels to the intelligence community.

-- Communication of intelligence judgments to policy levels.

-- Content and quality of the intelligence community response to policy level needs.

The NSCIC Working Group believes these are likely to be recurring problem areas, deserving early consideration and discussion in the NSCIC.

4. Expression by Policy Levels of Intelligence Needs

a. As the study clearly indicates there is a two way communication problem. The process by which policy-makers communicate their intelligence needs appears not to give enough guidance as to their specific needs. The study suggests that more attention to generating formal expressions of intelligence needs is required, particularly at the outset of a crisis period. A major problem is that formal need expression is time consuming and the requirement for rapid response in a fast-moving crisis tends to lead to request-response patterns which circumvent the formal structures. The use of informal channels is valuable, but can result in some confusion, lack of control, and, perhaps most important of all, a poorly organized sense of issues and direction on the part of the intelligence community.

b. Developments in the India-Pakistan crisis suggests that some type of focal point for the development, coordination and transmission of consumer intelligence needs to the intelligence community would improve intelligence responsiveness to important issues at the time they are of concern to policy levels.

c. The NSCIC might consider whether in its view it would be useful to have:

-- Periodic summaries of intelligence community positions during the course of lengthy crises of which the India-Pakistan crisis is an example.

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-- More National Intelligence Estimates or Office of National Estimates memoranda.

-- Differentiated types of products for the two phases of contingencies of the India-Pakistan type; a first phase of contingency policy planning and option generation, a second phase of crisis management.

5. Communication of Intelligence Output to Policy-makers

a. The study puts considerable stress on the quantity of intelligence communications and the problems involved in assuring that key intelligence communications stand out above the noise level created by the high volume flow of materials. This is an extremely important problem and there may be a need for some system of flagging top priority intelligence data and judgments for the attention of such key officials as members of the NSC, the NSCIC, the NSC Interdepartmental Group, and the Washington Special Action Group, particularly during crisis periods.

b. The study suggests the need for more attention to providing first rate executive summaries and constant attention to clear, strong exposition of key judgments by the intelligence community. The current situation makes the role of the policy level staffs crucial in filtering noise and providing emphasis. Improvement in the community product would make their job easier.

c. A lesson learned in carrying out the India-Pakistan study is how difficult it is, even a few months after the events, to find out how the process by which intelligence reaches the very top decision-makers and their staffs really functions. The study indicates that there are some problems in the process; informed and detailed judgments on the causes may have to be obtained by a different sort of study of the communication process and its problems. General experience in studying the behavior of decision-making processes in large, complex organizations shows that it is preferable to study the process in action, rather than after the fact.

d. The NSCIC might consider and give guidance to the intelligence community as to:

-- A desired means of flagging top priority intelligence data and judgments which are meant for the personal attention of key top officials particularly during crisis periods.

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-- The need for some special means of presenting key judgments, perhaps using executive summaries intended especially for the personnel who are involved in making policy and operational decisions.

-- Planning for a real-time study of the handling and use of intelligence inputs in the NSC decision-making process during the actual evolution of a crisis situation.

6. Content and Quality of the Intelligence Response

a. Some issues of the quality of the product are difficult to divorce from those connected with the communication problem. Others relate to specific problem areas surfaced in the study:

-- The adequacy of estimates and information on Indian and Soviet intentions.

-- The amount of raw information forwarded to high level consumers.

b. Questions the NSCIC might consider are:

-- Are you, as policy-makers, getting what you most need in the way of information on, and analysis of, the intentions of foreign governments? Would it be useful to differentiate estimates of current and likely future intentions?

-- What views do you have on the pros and cons of introducing raw intelligence directly into top level decision processes? Would some sort of background information supplied before or with raw intelligence limit the dangers? What guidance do you want to give to the intelligence community on this matter?

-- What should be the character of the procedures for supplying coordinated views during crisis periods? Would you prefer that the DCI obtain more direct participation of DIA and INR in the preparation of his briefing to WSAG and similar forums? Would it be useful to undertake rapid production of national estimates during periods of crisis, supplementing existing relevant NIEs? What should the production process and format be? Where differences exist would you prefer that they be clearly stated as alternative views?

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7. The Working Group recommends that after the members of NSCIC have an opportunity to review the India-Pakistan study, a meeting of the Committee be held. The purpose of this meeting would be to bring the lessons and issues more sharply into focus and to discuss some of the implications for the interface between policy-makers and the intelligence community.

(Signed) Bronson Tweedy

BRONSON TWEEDY
Chairman,
NSCIC Working Group

Attachment: India-Pakistan Crisis Study

Distribution:

Original - Adse.

1 - Mr. Tweedy

1 - PRG Subject File (filed NSCIC WG 1 - 72)

1 - [redacted]

1 - PRG Chrono

DCI/IC/[redacted] (5 October 72)

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